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Introduction
On January 4, 1980, President Jimmy Carter delivered an address concerning the Soviet
Union’s December 25, 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. “Massive Soviet military forces have
invaded the small, nonaligned, sovereign nation of Afghanistan,” Carter announced, “attempting
to conquer the fiercely independent Muslim people of that country.”1 “The United States wants
all nations in the region to be free and independent,” he continued, “therefore, the world simply
cannot stand by and permit the Soviet Union to commit this act with impunity.”2 Despite paying
lip service to the importance of defending the lofty ideals of freedom and independence, the US
government’s policies and actions surrounding the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan were directed
towards other goals, both symbolic and material. This essay argues that the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan was not a catastrophe for US Cold War foreign interests, but rather a US
provocation that bolstered US foreign policy objectives.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan triggered the Soviet-Afghan War, which lasted from
December 1979 to February 1989. Throughout the conflict, the US government, in cooperation
with allies such as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, led a sweeping covert operation in support of the
guerrilla militia that fought the Soviet military, the Mujahedin (Arabic for those who wage jihad,
or holy war). The funding of the Mujahedin was one of the most expensive and long-lasting
covert operations ever undertaken by the US government: US funding began with sixty million
dollars per year from 1980 to 1985, rose to 470 million dollars in 1986, and reached 630 million
dollars per year from 1987 to 1989.3 The conflict itself was extremely bloody, killing between
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850,000 and 1.5 million civilians and forcing millions of Afghans to flee their homes as
refugees.4
The dominant historical narrative surrounding US support for the Mujahedin propagates
the notion that US officials were shocked and appalled by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,
and consequently rushed to the aid of the Mujahedin in order to protect Afghanistan’s
sovereignty and religious freedom, and to forestall Soviet expansion into South Asia and the
Middle East. However, in 1996, eight years after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan,
former director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Robert Gates revealed in his memoirs
that the US government actually began funding the Mujahedin in July 1979, “six months before
the Soviets invaded Afghanistan.”5 Three years later, in a 1998 interview with the French
newspaper Le Nouvel Observateur, former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski
admitted that, with this covert aid to the Mujahedin, the US government “knowingly increased
the probability”6 that the Soviets would invade Afghanistan. Brzezinski enthusiastically
defended this decision, saying: “That secret operation was an excellent idea. It had the effect of
drawing the Russians into the Afghan trap…We now [had] the opportunity of giving to the
USSR its Vietnam war.’”7 Despite these admissions, however, the narrative that US aid to the
Mujahedin only began in reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan still pervades historical
accounts and US public memory of the Soviet-Afghan War.
This paper’s argument is two-fold. Using declassified US government documents and
memorandums from the 1970s and early 1980s, this essay first corroborates, substantiates, and
4
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develops Brzezinski’s admission that the 1979 US covert aid to the Mujahedin drew the Soviet
army into Afghanistan. This then begs the question: Why did the US government seek a Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan in the first place? The second part of this essay thus analyzes the various
strategic values of the Soviet-Afghan War to the US government, and the variousways in which
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan served US foreign interests. Before delving into these main
arguments, however, this essay begins with important background information about US foreign
policy during the Cold War, political developments in Afghanistan leading up to the Soviet
invasion, and the partnership between the US and Saudi Arabian governments, and outlines the
historical significance of examining the motivations behind the US backing of the Mujahedin.

The Soviet-Afghan War: History, Policy, and Significance
US Foreign Policy During the Cold War
The global political dynamics of the post-World War II era were dictated by the intense
rivalry and competition between the Soviet Union and the United States, known as The Cold
War. The Soviet Union was born out of the 1917 Bolshevik revolution that toppled the Russian
Tsarist monarchy and installed a strict communist regime inspired by Karl Marx’s 1848
Communist Manifesto. Soviet communism was characterized by the nationalization of virtually
all means of production, the disintegration of individual liberties, and an expansionist vision of
spreading communism throughout the world. As a result, the Soviet Union “was, at the end of
World War II, the most authoritarian society anywhere on the face of the earth.”8 The United
States, which self identified as both capitalist and democratic, vehemently opposed the Soviet
Union’s communist ideology and expansionist goals, many of which threatened US economic
8
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and strategic interests. Consequently, the US and Soviet governments entered into a vicious
competition to expand their respective spheres of influence and achieve global hegemony, which
lasted until the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991.
Although the Cold War, as its name indicates, never resulted in armed conflict on US or
Soviet soil, the conflict manifested itself in several extensive proxy wars in Vietnam, Korean,
Yemen, and Afghanistan, and led to several violent conflicts throughout Asia, Africa, and Latin
America. During the Cold War in general, and these proxy wars in particular, the US government
aimed to secure and expand its own sphere of influence, while curtailing the spread of Soviet
power. This strategy, known as containment, can be traced back to a lengthy 1946 telegram
written by George F. Kennan (a Foreign Service Officer at the US embassy in Moscow) in which
he argued that direct military force against the Soviet Union would be futile and, instead, the US
should pursue “long-term, patient, but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive
tendencies.”9
Kennan’s strategy of containment influenced US foreign policy for decades to come, and
is cited as the official logic behind the US support of the Mujahedin during the Soviet-Afghan
War. However, as this essay demonstrates, US foreign policy during the Cold War was not
always defensive, purely aiming to contain Soviet expansion. Indeed, as Henry Kissinger (then
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs) explained to the Shah of Iran (who was a
close US ally) in a meting in Washington, DC on July 24, 1973 (Figure 2): “Our [the US]
strategy has been to create an environment within which the Soviets will be forced to take hostile
acts, if they do, from as peaceful a base as possible. Our hope is to put them at a psychological
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disadvantage in doing this.”10 Later, Kissinger added: “We are trying to checkmate Soviet
influence wherever it appears and to exhaust them in any adventures they may pursue. We want
to create a frame of mind in the Politburo that is tired of costly activities in the Middle East
which do not produce results.”11
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Political History of Afghanistan During the Cold War
Before the Soviet-Afghan War, Afghanistan had endured a long history of political and
military strife; it is the only state to have been occupied by Great Britain (twice in the nineteenth
century), the Soviet Union (in the 1980s), and the United States (since 2001).12 Afghanistan was
ruled by King Mohammed Zahir Shah from 1933 to 1973 until, in July 1973, Zahir Shah was
deposed by his first cousin Mohammed Daoud Khan, who declared himself Afghanistan’s first
president. Initially, Daoud allied himself with the pro-Soviet Parchamis, a faction of the
communist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). However, Daoud soon realized
that if he remained heavily dependent on the Soviet Union, his government would miss out on
the opportunity to obtain aid from non-Soviet sources. Consequently, in 1975, Daoud distanced
himself from the Parchamis and secured financial support from anti-Soviet countries such as
Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia.13
In April 1978, members of the PDPA assassinated Daoud, establishing the communist
Democratic Republic of Afghanistan under the leadership of Nur Muhammad Taraki. However,
the PDPA lacked legitimacy, and the majority of Afghans knew nothing about communism
except that it was an atheist ideology and thus unacceptable to religious Muslims. Consequently,
opposition to Taraki’s regime grew, and Afghanistan soon descended into intense civil unrest.
By late summer 1979, Taraki had become entrenched in a deadly rivalry with party comrade
Hafizullah Amin, who ultimately managed to oust Taraki from office in September 1979.
Meanwhile, on July 3, 1979, President Carter had signed the first authorization for the CIA to
spend over half a million dollars on propaganda campaigns, radio equipment, medical supplies,
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and cash for the anti-Taraki rebels.14 With the help of this secret US aid, the anti-Taraki
insurgency gained considerable momentum, staging multiple uprisings and inducing general
countrywide chaos. Ultimately, this extreme civil unrest led the Soviet General Secretary Yuri
Andropov to conclude that “the Soviet Union must act decisively to replace Amin and shore up
Afghan communism.”15
On December 25, 1979, the Soviet military launched a full-scale invasion of Afghanistan,
assassinating Amin and installing a new government under the leadership of Babrak Karmal.
Following the invasion, Afghanistan’s various anti-communist, Islamic rebel groups coalesced to
form the anti-Soviet Mujahedin. Along with the Saudi Arabian and Pakistani governments, the
US government secretly funnelled millions of dollars in aid, as well as in military supplies and
weapons (including Stinger missiles), to the Mujahedin, which ultimately enabled the guerrilla
army to drive the Soviets out of Afghanistan in 1989.

US-Saudi Relations
In addition to US Cold War policy and twentieth-century Afghan political history, the
development of US-Saudi relations is crucial to the historical background and outcomes of the
Soviet-Afghan War. During the 1940s, the US government became increasingly interested in
building an alliance with Saudi Arabian monarchy, leading President Franklin D. Roosevelt to
meet with the Saudi King Abdulaziz Ibn Saud in Egypt in February 1945. Traditionally, it is
believed that the US interest in Saudi Arabia was driven predominantly by oil; indeed, Ibn Saud
had signed an exclusive oil concession to the consortium of US companies that would become
the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO) in 1939, and the US government viewed
14
15
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access to Middle Eastern (and particularly Saudi Arabian) oil as valuable for the post-World War
II reconstruction of Europe’s devastated economies.16 However, the main impetus behind the US
government’s interest in a US-Saudi partnership was the desire to have US military troops pass
through and be stationed in Saudi Arabian land.17
During the 1950s, the US government was eager to maintain access to the valuable
Dhahran air base (located in the Eastern province of Saudi Arabia), which had come under US
control in 1945. Consequently, in 1957, President Eisenhower invited King Saud to Washington,
where he promised significant military and economic support to the King in return for
permission for the US military to to occupy Dhahran. During the 1950s, the air base at Dhahran
(which remained in US control until 1962, and then again from 1991 to 2001) was the largest US
military base in the eastern hemisphere, and was therefore a vital component to US military
dominance in the Middle East and Asia generally.18
In the 1950s and 1960s, the US government became increasingly concerned about the
potential expansion of Soviet influence into the Middle East, which remained a region of utmost
strategic importance due to its central location between Europe, Asia, and Africa and rich oil
reserves. Thus, the US government embarked on a mission to strengthen its own sphere of
influence in the Middle East, ramping up efforts to solidify its relationship with Saudi Arabia and
other anti-communist states in the region. Subsequently, in the 1950s and 1960s, pressure to join
a US-sponsored alliance in the Middle East played a substantial role in the polarization of Arab
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states into what historian Malcolm Kerr calls the “Arab Cold War,”19 between Nasser’s socialist
Egypt and King Faisal’s anti-communist and staunchly Islamic Saudi Arabia.
In June 1974, President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger brought
Prince Fahd Al Saud, the Saudi Minister of the Interior, to Washington, where the leaders
reiterated their joint commitment to combatting communist pressures in the Middle East.20 In this
meeting, Nixon and Kissinger also relayed, emphatically, their admiration for the Saudi Arabian
leadership, stressing that the US “attitude towards Saudi Arabia and toward the Saudi people was
based on friendship and respect.”21 Thus, by the mid-1970s, the US and Saudi Arabian
governments had established a relatively strong partnership, grounded both in their shared
opposition to communism, and in the Saudi Arabian government’s commitment to apply a
moderate oil policy that would maintain low oil prices for the benefit of the United States and
Europe. In return, the US promised to provide economic and military support to the Saudi
Arabian monarchy.22

Significance of the Soviet-Afghan War
Beyond understanding the historical background to the Soviet-Afghan War, it is crucial
to recognize that US and Soviet intervention in Afghanistan has had drastic, long-term
consequences. In addition to the millions of lives lost during the Soviet-Afghan War, the conflict
solidified the concept of global jihad, provided a platform for the emergence of al-Qaeda, and
precipitated the rise of the Taliban regime.
19
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US foreign policymakers realized that political Islam could be used as a tool against
communism long before the Soviet-Afghan War: the US government supported the Sarekat-iIslam against Sukarno in Indonesia, the Jamaat-i-Islami against Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in Pakistan,
and the Muslim Brotherhood against Nasser in Egypt.23 Throughout the 1980s, the US
government and its allies fervently depicted the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as a war against
Islam. The world had never seen an international, pan-Arab armed jihad but, in Afghanistan, “the
CIA was determined to create one in service of a contemporary political objective.”24 As a result,
thousands of Muslim recruits from the Middle East and beyond, encouraged by their respective
governments, flocked to Afghanistan, eager to fulfill what they came to see as a religious duty in
the fight against the Soviet Union. Once in the Mujahedin training camps, the recruits became
“ideologically charged with the spark of holy war”25 and, for decades to come, this spark would
ignite the firestorm that we have since come to regard as global Islamist extremism.
Among the recruits who travelled to Afghanistan to fight in the Soviet-Afghan War were
Abdullah Azzam, a Sunni Islamic scholar from Palestine, and Osama bin Laden, the son of a
Saudi Arabian billionaire originally from Yemen. In 1984, Azzam and bin Laden founded the
Office of Services, a recruitment and support network for Mujahedin soldiers. After Azzam’s
death in 1989, bin Laden merged the organization with other Islamic extremist groups, creating
al-Qaeda. As “the first truly global terrorist organization in history,”26 al-Qaeda carried out
multiple deadly attacks around the globe, including the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United
States. Indeed, as Rashid Khalidi writes in Sowing Crisis, 9/11 was “the evil work of the distant
23
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but very real ghosts originally conjured up by the United States to wage the last phase of the
Cold War.”27
The Soviet-Afghan War also set the stage for the rise of the Taliban, the Islamic
fundamentalist regime that ruled Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001. The Taliban was born in the
late 1980s in Pakistan, just across the border from the Afghan province of Kandahar, by “veteran
fighters in the anti-Soviet jihad.”28 Three years after the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, the
de facto communist government collapsed, leading to a violent power struggle between factions
of the Mujahedin and networks of Afghan warlords. Ultimately, given this power vacuum,
Taliban leader Mullah Omar was able to seize power relatively easily in 1996, promising
stability during a time of utter chaos. “Tragically, though, the Taliban, born out of a brutalized
society, was to brutalize it further”29: throughout its rule, the Taliban regime was immensely
oppressive and abusive of its citizens, and particularly of Afghan women, and harboured and
cooperated with members of al-Qaeda.
In response to the 9/11 attacks, the United States army invaded Afghanistan on October
7, 2001, toppling the Taliban regime two months later. Over the course of the US war with
Afghanistan, thousands of Afghan citizens and US soldier have perished, millions of tax dollars
have been spent, and local resentment towards the US presence in Afghanistan has intensified.
Despite President Obama’s initial promise to end the war by 2014, some 5,500 US troops remain
in Afghanistan to this day.30 In retrospect, it is clear that the Soviet-Afghan War launched a
cascade of devastating local and global disasters that continue to plague our world. These
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consequences make it all the more important that we take a critical approach when examining
US policies and actions related to the Soviet-Afghan War. As Mahmood Mamdani reminds us in
Good Muslim, Bad Muslim, “If 9/11 cut short the celebration of [the US Cold War] victory, it
also posed the question: At what price was the Cold War won?”31

“Drawing the Russians into the Afghan trap”32:
The US Provocation of the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan
Contrary to popular belief, the US government began funnelling aid to the Afghan rebels
in July 1979, thus “knowingly increas[ing] the probability” 33 that the Soviet Union would invade
Afghanistan. This was expressed by Zbigniew Brzezinski in a January 1998 interview with Le
Nouvel Observateur (Figure 3). In English, the most pertinent excerpt from the interview reads:
Le Nouvel Observateur (N. O.): The former director of the CIA, Robert Gates, stated in his
memoirs that the US intelligence services began to aid the Mujahedin in Afghanistan six months
before the Soviet intervention. In this period, you were the national security advisor to President
Carter. You therefore played a key role in this affair. Is this correct?
Zbigniew Brzezinski: Yes. According to the official version of history, CIA aid to the Mujahedin
began during 1980, that is to say, after the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan on December 24,
1979. But the reality, closely guarded until now, is completely otherwise: Indeed, it was July 3,
1979 that President Carter signed the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of the proSoviet regime in Kabul. And that very day, I wrote a note to the president in which I explained to
him that in my opinion this aid was going to induce a Soviet military intervention [emphasis added
throughout].
N. O.: Despite this risk, you were an advocate of this covert action. But perhaps you yourself
desired this Soviet entry into the war and looked for a way to provoke it?
Z. Brzezinski: It wasn’t quite like that. We didn’t push the Russians to intervene, but we
knowingly increased the probability that they would.
N. O.: When the Soviets justified their intervention by asserting that they intended to fight against
secret US involvement in Afghanistan, nobody believed them. However, there was an element of
truth in this. You don’t regret any of this today?
Z. Brzezinski.: Regret what? That secret operation was an excellent idea. It had the effect of
drawing the Russians into the Afghan trap and you want me to regret it? The day that the Soviets
31
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officially crossed the border, I wrote to President Carter, essentially: “We now have the
opportunity of giving to the USSR its Vietnam War." Indeed, for almost ten years, Moscow had to
carry on a war that was unsustainable for the regime, a conflict that bought about the
demoralization and finally the breakup of the Soviet Empire.34
Figure 3: Jauvert, Vincent. “Les Révélations d’un Ancien Conseiller de Carter: ‘Oui, le CIA est entrée en
Afghanistan avant les Russes….’” Le Nouvel Observateur, January 15-21, 1998.

Despite this unambiguous interview, the question of whether or not US officials aimed to
draw the Soviets into Afghanistan remains contentious. Specifically, prominent historical
accounts of the Cold War published after 1998 still propagate the narrative that US officials were
blindsided by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, supporting the Mujahedin only in response to
Soviet military action. These historical accounts do not discuss the various US strategic values of
the Soviet-Afghan War, instead portraying the event as a Cold War catastrophe for the US
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government. The following section analyzes some of the most prominent of such historical
accounts, in turn outlining the historiographical significance of this essay’s argument.

US Support of the Mujahedin: A Historiographical Portrait
The notion that the US government began bolstering the Mujahedin only after the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan pervades historical accounts of the formation of al-Qaeda and its
connection to the Soviet-Afghan War. In The Search for al-Qaeda, Bruce Riedel writes that “in
response, [to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan] President Jimmy Carter ordered the CIA to
support the mujahedin resistance.”35 Similarly, in Holy War Inc., Peter L. Bergen argues that “if
any conflict deserved to be called a just jihad, the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan surely
was. Unprovoked, a superpower invaded a largely peasant nation and inflicted on it a total,
totalitarian war.”36 Even more disconcerting, though, is the prevalence of this narrative in recent,
comprehensive, and supposedly authoritative, historical accounts of the Cold War.
In his 2005 publication The Cold War, preeminent Cold War historian John Lewis Gaddis
attributes the Soviet decision to invade Afghanistan to the US-Soviet joint statement of “Basic
Principles” reached at the 1972 Moscow summit,37 rather than to the intense civil unrest caused
by the anti-Taraki insurgents and amplified by US aid. Gaddis writes that the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, coupled with the humiliation of the November 1979 Iranian hostage crisis,38 “made
it seem as though Washington was on the defensive everywhere, and Moscow was on a roll.”39
Conspicuously, Gaddis does not discuss covert US support of the Mujahedin, or any of
35
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Brzezinski’s comments on the subject, anywhere in his book. Notably, though, when asked by
the author of this essay about Brzezinski’s 1998 interview with Le Nouvel Observateur and the
possibility that the US government knowingly catalyzed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a
preeminent Cold War historian who wishes to remain anonymous replied: “it would not surprise
me.”40
More recent publications go even further in depicting the alleged shock of the Soviet
invasion to the US government. In “Islamism, the Iranian revolution, and the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan,” published in 2010 in The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Amin Saikal asserts
that “the [Soviet] invasion [of Afghanistan] shocked the West, especially the United States,
which felt that it had been deceived despite its sustained efforts to maintain a policy of
détente.”41 Saikal notes that Brzezinski had warned Carter about a “creeping Soviet invasion,”42
and even lists the 1998 Le Nouvel Observateur interview in his bibliography, yet he fails to
include the fact that, through its 1979 aid to the anti-Taraki insurgents, the US government had
actively increased the likelihood of the Soviets invading Afghanistan. Instead, Saikal claims that
the US decision to back the Mujahedin was made after Soviet forces entered Afghanistan. 43
In addition to Gaddis and Saikal, several authors who acknowledge that covert CIA aid to
the Afghan rebels started in July 1979 reject the admissions made in Brzezinski’s 1998
interview. For instance, in A Choice of Enemies, British war studies expert Lawrence Freedman
writes:
Some care is needed, as this statement [that Brzezinski’s intention was to provoke a Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan] can be overinterpreted. Brzezinski was reclaiming from Regan and for
40
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Carter some of the credit for bringing down the Soviet Union, as the inability to cope with the
Afghan insurgency was one factor in draining credibility from the Soviet leadership. But in 1979,
the United States was at most a bit player in a local drama with its script written elsewhere. The
conflict within Afghanistan was the result of a sequence of coups and uprisings in which the
ambitions of the Communists was matched only by their internal disarray and political
incompetence. Nothing the United States did that summer led to the fiasco of Amin’s victory over
Taraki or to the Soviet misapprehension that if only they could engineer a takeover by more
politically savvy Communists, then everything would be fine.44

Although US aid to the Afghan rebels in the latter half of 1979 was not the only factor that led
the Soviets to invade Afghanistan, Freedman’s assertion that “nothing the United States did that
summer” affected Soviet action is tenuous. Beyond the above paragraph, Freedman fails to prove
the claim that US aid actually had no effect on the escalation of the anti-Taraki insurgency.
Moreover, Freedman’s logic is flawed; his claim that US aid to the Afghan rebels prior to the
Soviet occupation was ineffective has no bearing on whether or not the intention of such support
was to induce a Soviet invasion.
Finally, prominent journalist Steve Coll also rejects the admissions made in Brzezinski’s
1998 interview in his book Ghost Wars. Coll does mention that the CIA began funneling aid to
the Mujahedin prior to the Soviet invasion, however, in a footnote to Ghost Wars, Coll discounts
the content of Brzezinski’s 1998 interview, writing
[In the interview], Brzezinski implied that he had slyly lured the Soviets into a trap in
Afghanistan. But his contemporary memos—particularly those written in the first days after the
Soviet invasion—make clear that while Brzezinski was determined to confront the Soviets in
Afghanistan, he was also very worried that the Soviets would prevail. Those early memos show no
hint of satisfaction that the Soviets had taken some sort of Afghan bait. Given this evidence and
the enormous political and security costs that the invasion imposed on the Carter administration,
any claim that Brzezinski lured the Soviets into Afghanistan warrants deep skepticism.45

Coll, however, does not include or reference any of the “contemporary memos” that allegedly
prove his claim. A thorough analysis of several of Brzezinski’s memos from the days after the
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Soviet invasion, along with various other US government documents from the late 1970s and
early 1980s, reveals that the US government did, in fact, take steps to provoke and intensify the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Although some documents express anxiety about the prospect of
the Soviets prevailing in Afghanistan, such expressions of concern do not contradict or
undermine the US government’s goal of drawing the Soviets into Afghanistan, keeping them in a
long, demoralizing, and costly conflict, and then eventually forcing them to withdraw. Indeed,
the plan to provoke the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and anxiety about the possibility of this
plan backfiring are not mutually exclusive. Moreover, Coll fails to explain why Brzezinski
would have confessed to Le Nouvel Observateur that US foreign policymakers knowingly
increased the chances of a Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and continued to support the antiTaraki insurgents despite the prediction that this may induce Soviet military action, if this was
not, in fact, the US government’s objective. Considering that Brzezinski’ 1998 admissions have
not yet been accepted into prominent Cold War historical narratives, however, the following
section employs declassified US government documents to corroborate, substantiate, and
develop Brzezinski’s claims.

US Foreign Policy in Afghanistan, 1978 - 1980
A close review of declassified US government documents and memos from the mid
1970s through to 1980 reveals that US foreign policymakers did, indeed, aim to draw the Soviets
into Afghanistan, aligning with the US strategy of creating “an environment within which the
Soviets will be forced to take hostile acts.”46 Not surprisingly, many of the most useful
documents elucidating the decision to begin aiding the Mujahedin are from the years 1978 and
46
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1979. One of these documents is an April 30, 1978 briefing memo from Assistant Secretary of
State for Near Eastern Affairs Harold H. Saunders to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, which
confirms the installation of Taraki as President of Afghanistan and outlines subsequent US
policy considerations (Figure 4). In this memo, Saunders expresses the view that, despite
Taraki’s takeover, the establishment of a communist government in Afghanistan and the
possibility of a Soviet occupation were not inevitable or even likely outcomes. According to
Saunders, “a knowledgeable American who knows Taraki well considers him more an Afghan
nationalist than pro-Soviet.”47 In June 1978, Vance also affirmed that the Taraki administration
“avoided describing their government as Communist or Marxist-Leninist; they have expressed
willingness to work and cooperate with all countries and to preserve their nonaligned position.”48
Hence, the establishment of Soviet-style communist rule in Afghanistan was not necessarily one
of Taraki’s main objectives.
In the aforementioned memo to Vance, Saunders also highlights the widespread
resistance to communism in Afghanistan, predicting “serious difficulties between nonCommunist elements in the military and the Communist leadership”49 and noting that “in the
long run, the Afghan tribes, stirred up by traditional religious leaders, could create disorder in the
countryside for the ‘Godless Communists.’”50 Moreover, in the memo’s “Policy Considerations”
section, Saunders stresses that Vance “need[s] to take into account the mix of nationalism and
communism in the new leadership and seek to avoid driving the regime into a closer embrace
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with the Soviet Union than it might wish,”51 implying that Saunders did not perceive Taraki’s
regime as having particularly close ties with the Soviet Union. Overall, it is clear that Saunders
did not believe that Taraki’s takeover would lead to the formation of Soviet-style communist rule
or a Soviet satellite state in Afghanistan. Even if Taraki did invite significant Soviet influence
into Afghanistan, anti-communist factions in the Afghan military and tribal groups would likely
be able to sustain sufficient resistance. Hence, as of April 1978, despite Taraki’s rise to power,
US officials were not under the impression that they needed to increase the US presence in
Afghanistan or bolster anti-communist forces in order to thwart the establishment of a
communist Soviet puppet government, as this outcome was not expected.
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Figure 4: United States Department of State. Situation in Afghanistan. April 30, 1978. Digital National Security
Archive. http://search.proquest.com/docview/1679057623?accountid=15172.
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By March 1979, US officials still believed that the formation of a communist, Soviet
proxy government in Afghanistan was unlikely. For instance, in a March 25, 1979 cable from US
ambassador to Iran William H. Sullivan to US Embassies in India, Pakistan, the United
Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, Sullivan underscores the rapidly growing anti-Taraki
insurgency in Afghanistan and, consequently, the highly precarious state of Taraki’s regime.
Sullivan explains: “rebellion is widespread and affects at least eight provinces”52 and “the
Afghan government has no confidence in most of its army…if the Afghan government had to
stand alone it would not last for more than a week.”53 Evidently, from the US perspective the
establishment of a viable and stable communist government under Taraki was still seen as highly
unlikely. Importantly, however, Sullivan laments the lack of foreign government support for the
anti-Taraki insurgency in Afghanistan, writing: “Unfortunately, neither U.S. nor Pakistani nor
Iranian governments appear to be interested in assisting the revolt.”54 This statement is
significant as it demonstrates that, despite the lack of a serious threat of Soviet military
intervention in Afghanistan, US policy recommendations encouraged the support of the
Mujahedin rebels months before the actual Soviet invasion.
By May 1979, most CIA analysts “continued to predict that the Soviet forces would not
invade to quell the [anti-Taraki] rebellion.”55 The US embassy in Moscow agreed, writing in a
May 24, 1979 cable that “under foreseeable circumstances, [the Soviet Union] will probably
avoid shouldering a substantial part of the anti-insurgency combat.”56 Indeed, the US prediction
that the Soviet military would not invade Afghanistan as a result of the anti-Taraki rebellion
52
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accurately reflected intentions inside the Kremlin. On June 28, 1979, a working group led by
Yuri Andropov concluded that the communist revolution in Afghanistan was struggling due to
“economic backwardness, the small size of the working class, and the weakness of the local
Communist Party, as well as the selfishness of the Afghan leaders,”57 rather than due to a lack of
military might. This conclusion implies that Soviet officials did not see military occupation of
Afghanistan as the solution to the struggling communist movement, reaffirming the notion that,
as of June 1979, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was not imminent or inevitable.
Despite the fact that US government and intelligence personnel were not expecting the
Soviet Union to invade Afghanistan, in late June 1979, Brzezinski recommended to President
Carter that he endorse non-lethal covert support of the Afghan insurgency. Just over a week later,
on July 3, 1979, Carter signed a presidential finding authorizing the CIA to spend over fivehundred thousand dollars on propaganda, radios, medical supplies, and cash for the Afghan
rebels.58 Distributed through the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), these supplies
launched what would become the enormous, decade-long, US covert operation in support of the
Mujahedin forces.
Even after the initial decision to send funds and supplies to the Afghan rebels, US
officials still did not predict that the Soviets would invade Afghanistan. On September 7, 1979,
the CIA released a full briefing on Soviet military activities in northern Afghanistan, concluding
“that there is no persuasive evidence at this time that the Soviets are about to move combat units
into Afghanistan.”59 The fact that US officials did not expect the Soviets to invade Afghanistan is
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also made clear by a report entitled “The Political and Military Situation in Afghanistan” (Figure
5), released on an unspecified date between July 15 and December 31, 1979.60 The report
emphasizes the increasingly unstable nature of Taraki’s rule, noting that his regime had come to
depend on support from Soviet advisors in Afghanistan (the report estimates that there were
between fifteen-hundred and two-thousand Soviet advisors in Afghanistan).61 Despite this
support, however, the report concludes that “the [Taraki] regime does not yet face a security
situation that might prompt a request for the direct intervention of Soviet forces,”62 and that
although the Soviets “may go to some length to protect their interests in Afghanistan,”63 they will
“probably not [go] to the extent of intervening militarily.”64 Importantly, though, the report states
that “if serious fighting broke out in areas near the Soviet border, Moscow might provide
increased numbers of tactical aircraft, helicopters, pilots and advisors to assist Kabul.”65 Thus,
prior to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, US policy advisors recognized that an escalation of
the anti-Taraki rebellion could cause the Soviets to increase their presence in Afghanistan.
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Figure 5: The Political and Military Situation in Afghanistan. 1979. National Digital Security Archive.
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1679055493?accountid=15172.
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Indeed, a September 27, 1979 Interagency Intelligence Memorandum (Figure 6) written
by the Director of the CIA reinforces the conclusion that heightened revolt against Taraki could
trigger Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. Entitled “Soviet Options in Afghanistan,” the
memorandum declares that “the Soviet leadership has wished to avoid allowing the situation to
deteriorate to a point where only large-scale intervention by Soviet troops could save the Afghan
regime,”66 concluding that there have been no signs that the Soviets are preparing ground forces
for large-scale military intervention.67 However, the memo also presents “contingencies under
which the chances of large-scale and long-term Soviet intervention would become substantially
greater,” 68 such as prolonged political chaos, the prospect of the rise of an anti-Soviet regime,
and/or foreign military intervention in Afghanistan.69 Thus, it is clear that the purpose of the
covert 1979 aid to the Afghan rebel forces was not to prepare the insurgents for an impending
Soviet invasion, as such an invasion was not expected. Rather, this aid was meant to escalate the
anti-Taraki rebellion in order to compel the Soviets to pursue a large-scale military operation in
Afghanistan.
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Figure 6: United States Director of Central Intelligence. Soviet Options in Afghanistan. September 27, 1979. Digital
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The US strategy of bolstering the anti-Taraki insurgency in order to draw the Soviets into
Afghanistan proved successful, for on December 25, 1979, the Soviet Union launched its
invasion of Afghanistan. Seventeen days after the occupation, the CIA National Foreign
Assessment Center concluded that “Soviet decisions on the scope and timing of the intervention
in Afghanistan were dictated largely by the situation in that country.”70 One month later, the US
Defense Intelligence Agency released a report attributing the timing of the Soviet invasion to the
escalation of political chaos within Afghanistan, citing intense bursts of insurrection, such as the
March 1979 uprising in the Afghan city of Heart, as incidents that “deepened Soviet concerns.” 71
The Director of the CIA also published a report in March 1980 concluding that “Moscow’s
willingness to pay what it anticipated would be an appreciable political and economic price for
its intervention in Afghanistan stemmed from the deteriorating situation in that country.”72
Indeed, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was induced by the growing Afghan insurgency,
which, since July 1979, had been maintained and enhanced by the CIA. As this essay has
demonstrated, during the period leading up to December 1979, the US government did not
expect the Soviet Union to invade Afghanistan. Thus, the US aid funnelled to the Afghan rebels
was not intended to prepare the insurgents for an impending Soviet attack, but rather to heighten
tensions on the ground in order to draw the Soviets into Afghanistan. Indeed, as the following
section of this essay argues, Soviet military aggression in Afghanistan presented many strategic
advantages to the US government.
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“A rallying point for our policies in the area”73:
The Strategic Values of the Soviet-Afghan War to the US Government
Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the US government was determined to
maintain the Mujahedin resistance in order to prevent a Soviet victory. After all, a Soviet
annexation of Afghanistan, would have allowed Moscow to come dangerously close to the
Middle Eastern oil fields, and to its age-old goal of having access to a warm water port (in this
case, the Indian Ocean). However, the language used in US government documents from the
early 1980s suggests that the primary focus was on maintaining and intensifying the conflict in
Afghanistan, rather than driving the Soviets out as quickly as possible. While the long-term goal
was to defeat the Soviets in Afghanistan, the US government first aimed to use the conflict to
inflict as much damage on the Soviet Union as possible. As the Special Coordinating Committee
(SCC), which included, aside from President Carter, most of the key figures from the White
House, State Department, Defense Department, Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Security Council,
and Central Intelligence Agency,74 concluded in a December 26, 1979 meeting in the White
House Situation Room: “The greatest risk that we face is a quick, effective, Soviet operation to
pacify Afghanistan. This would be extremely costly to our image in the region and to your
[President Carter’s] position here at home. Our objective, then, should be to make the operation
as costly as possible for the Soviets.”75
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As Soviet Ambassador to the United Stats Anatoly Dobrynin articulated in 1978,
“Historically…the Soviet Union has sought a balanced situation in Afghanistan, and was not
seeking to take over the country.”76 Even after the invasion, US officials did not universally
believe that the Soviet Union would maintain the occupation of Afghanistan until the country
was annexed or until a viable communist government was established. For instance, in a January
16, 1980 memo to President Carter, Director of the CIA Stansfield Turner concluded: “it is
unlikely that the Soviet occupation is a preplanned first step in the implementation of a highly
articulated grand design for the rapid establishment of hegemonic control over all of Southwest
Asia.”77 In February 1980, Senior US Foreign Ministry Official Eric Gonsalves also argued:
“what the Soviets want in Kabul is a government which would not threaten it, not necessarily a
Marxist one. The Soviets did not want to keep their troops in Afghanistan since this would
inevitably mean that in a few years the US would also build up forces in the area.”78 Despite the
possibility that the Soviets were willing to negotiate a settlement guaranteeing a non-threatening,
non-aligned government in Afghanistan, however, US officials maintained that “it was essential
that Afghanistani resistance continues.”79
One of the most adamant advocates of perpetuating Soviet military aggression in
Afghanistan was Eugene V. Rostow, who served as the Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs under President Lyndon B. Johnson. In 1980, Rostow was the Dean of Yale Law School
and the founding member of the hawkish Committee on Present Danger, a non-partisan foreign
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interest group dedicated to lobbying Washington to take action on what the Committee sees as
the most imminent dangers to the United States. During his presidency, Carter “would embrace
almost every recommendation made by the Committee.”80 In a January 9, 1980 letter to
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and copied to Brzezinski, Rostow reflects on a meeting he
attended with Vance, President Carter and other US foreign policy advisors that morning, where
they discussed the Soviet move into Afghanistan. In the letter, Rostow underscores “why it is so
important to do everything reasonable to prolong and intensify the battle in Afghanistan itself”
(emphasis added). 81 He urges Vance to “revivify the CIA, and use it more, in situations like the
one we are facing [in Afghanistan].”82 Why, however, was a prominent US foreign policy
advisor advocating to prolong and intensify the conflict in Afghanistan, rather than to drive the
Soviets out as quickly as possible? Simply put, Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan
served US interests. Specifically, US officials aimed to use the Soviet military presence in
Afghanistan to cause the Soviets to incur significant economic and political costs, to gain the
support of European allies on anti-Soviet initiatives, and to expand US military capabilities and
general influence in the Middle East and particularly in Saudi Arabia. The following sections
will detail these strategic advantages presented by the Soviet-Afghan War to the US government,
underscoring the notion that US foreign policymakers did, indeed, favor and exploit Soviet
military intervention in Afghanistan.
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Bleeding the Soviets
The first US strategic value of the Soviet war in Afghanistan was the opportunity to
deplete Soviet resources and global support, giving the Soviet Union, as Brzezinski put it, “its
Vietnam War.”83 As several US government documents from the weeks following the invasion
reveal, US officials strove to make intervention in Afghanistan “as costly as possible”84 for the
Soviets.
In February 1987, the CIA published a report estimating that, since December 1979, the
Soviet government had spent over fifteen billion dollars on the conduct of war in Afghanistan,
and that had the Soviet Union had not invaded Afghanistan, spending would have remained at
three billion dollars.85 However, the report concedes that its “estimate of total costs is more
likely to be high than low,”86 as it used the high end of estimated aircraft losses (a difference of
two billion dollars). It appears that the CIA inflated the war’s estimated total costs in order to
represent Soviet intervention in Afghanistan as potentially more costly than it actually was, thus
underscoring the importance of the goal of inflicting costs on the Soviets to the US government.
In addition to the immense human and economic costs that come with any war, the US
government strove to make Soviet operations in Afghanistan “as politically costly as possible.”87
Even before the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan, US foreign policy advisors anticipated that a
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Soviet invasion of Afghanistan would elicit widespread, global criticisms.”88 U.S. officials also
saw an opportunity to besmirch the Soviet Union’s reputation in the eyes of communists who
respected Taraki and might blame the Soviets for failing to ensure that he remain in power. As
National Security Council Staffer Thomas Thornton wrote in a September 17, 1979 memo to
Brzezinski, “whatever the Soviet role in this [Taraki’s replacement by Amin], they should be
made to look as if they had a hand in the operation. Taraki was something of a Lenin figure and
had a degree of foreign respect. Amin is the Stalin of the drama and the Soviets should have him
hung prominently around their necks.”89 Evidently, months before the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, US foreign policy advisors were already thinking about how to use the situation in
Afghanistan to tarnish the Soviet Union’s global image.
On the day following the Soviet army’s move into Afghanistan, Brzezinski wrote to
President Carter: “There are already 300,000 refugees from Afghanistan in Pakistan, and we will
be in a position to indict the Soviets for causing massive human suffering. That figure will
certainly grow, and Soviet-sponsored actions in Cambodia have already taken their toll as
well.”90 Clearly, Brzezinski was excited by the opportunity to chip away at the Soviet Union’s
global popular support by capitalizing upon the suffering caused by the conflict in Afghanistan.
In 1987, the aforementioned CIA report detailing the costs of the Soviet-Afghan War to the
Soviet Union summarized the substantial political costs of the operation:
Soviet leaders continue to express frustration over the protracted war in Afghanistan. This was
evident at the party congress in February 1986 when General Secretary Gorbachev referred to the
war as a “bleeding wound.” Soviet involvement in Afghanistan has led to periodic censure within
the United Nations, become a stumbling block to improved Sino-Soviet relations, and complicated
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Soviet policy toward nations in the nonaligned movement. At home, pockets of social unrest
related to Afghanistan, the diversion of energies from pressing economic problems, and
dissatisfaction in the political hierarchy over the failure to end the war also probably worry the
leadership.91

The clear and consistent theme is that one of the US government’s goals in Afghanistan was to
inflict damaging economic and political costs on the Soviets, thus attempting to use the war as an
opportunity to pull ahead of the Soviet Union in the Cold War competition for global power and
influence.

Securing European Allies’ Support for Anti-Soviet Initiatives
In addition to making intervention in Afghanistan highly costly for the Soviets, the US
government relied on the escalation of tensions and Soviet aggression in Afghanistan to gain
support from European allies for US-led anti-Soviet initiatives, such as the boycott of the 1980
Moscow Olympics and the implementation of global economic sanctions against the Soviet
Union. A series of documents in the Cyrus Vance Archive housed at Yale University, entitled
“Allied Reactions,” charts US efforts to convince leaders of European powers to support antiSoviet initiatives in light of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, as well as these leaders’
reluctance to support the anti-Soviet endeavours. As President Carter put it in March 1980, “the
problem [was] how to keep the Allies with us and win propaganda points.”92
In a January 29, 1980 memo to Vance, George S. Vest (assistant Secretary of State for
European Affairs) explained that several European leaders (British, French, and German in
particular) worried that the US government would “do too much too fast and [and] publicly press
them to show solidarity in ways that they will judge as tactically wrong—for them or for us—
91
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impossible, or too dangerous.”93 For instance, Chancellor of Germany Helmut Schmidt
expressed deep concerns about the intensity and velocity of the US backlash against the Soviet
Union, fearing that US actions would lead to a harmful and unnecessary escalation of East-West
tensions.94 The chancellor was particularly puzzled by the US commitment to punish the Soviet
Union, asking Vance, “is it really our goal to punish the Soviet Union, and if so what do we wish
to achieve?”95 Chancellor Schmidt also “state[d] frankly that he had not understood some of the
US actions”96 and complained that “the US had taken decisions on its own and then expected the
Allies to say ‘Me, too,’ within 24 hours,”97 citing the boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics as
an example. Clearly, the United States’ European allies were not as willing to support and assist
with US initiatives to publicly condemn and punish the Soviet Union as the US government
would have liked.
In response to the European allies’ hesitation to join the US government in its vehement
condemnation of the Soviet Union, an SCC discussion paper concluded that “our [the United
States’] allies’ democratic societies, despite their awareness of the reliance on ME [Middle East]
oil, do not necessarily see the Soviet presence in the area [Afghanistan] as a threat in the same
way we do, and therefore they are not always ready or able to work in parallel with us.”98
Prominent US foreign policy advisor Peter Tarnoff also explained that “most Europeans [saw
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Afghanistan] as a ‘special case’ rather than a model for further Soviet expansionism to come”99
(Figure 7). Thus, Tarnoff contended, “the will to punish the Soviets in any tangible sense…is not
likely to grow unless there is some new and dramatic escalation of Soviet action in
Afghanistan.”100
Figure 7: Tarnoff memo to Brzezinski. April 26, 1980. Box 7, Cyrus R. and Grace Sloane Vance Papers, Yale
Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Libraries.
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Hence, US foreign policy advisors understood that in order to secure support from the
governments of European powers such as Great Britain, France, and Germany for global antiSoviet initiatives, their perceived threat of Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan had to
grow. Once again, an escalation of Soviet military aggression in Afghanistan would serve US
political interests.

Solidifying the US Sphere of Influence in the Middle East
In addition to inflicting costs on the Soviet Union and securing European allies’ support
for anti-Soviet initiatives, the third value of Soviet military action in Afghanistan for the US
government was the potential to highlight the invasion and continuing occupation as a
demonstration of serious Soviet aggression and expansionism. Ultimately, the US government
would leverage this perceived threat to strengthen relations with countries in the Middle East and
South Asia, drawing these states further into the US sphere of influence.
In order to intensify the perceived dangers posed by the Soviets in Afghanistan, President
Carter encouraged US and Western European leaders to “dramatize our concern about
Afghanistan.”101 In this vein, Brzezinski continually insisted on directing extensive global media
attention toward the conflict, asking the US International Communication Agency to “take
positive steps to ensure that there be the high level of coverage demanded by the situation.”102
Ultimately, Carter and Brzezinski aimed to whip the international community, and specifically
non-communist states in the Middle East, into an anti-Soviet frenzy by intensifying fears of
Soviet expansion into the Middle East and South Asia.
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In its public stance towards Soviet actions in Afghanistan, however, the US government
had to maintain a fine balance between magnifying the threat posed by Soviet military action in
Afghanistan, and convincing the global public that, with the support of international allies, the
United States would ultimately prevail. This balance is apparent in President Carter’s January 4,
1980 televised address to the United States—and ultimately the world—regarding the Soviet
occupation of Afghanistan. In this speech, Carter declares that the “invasion is an extremely
serious threat to peace because of the threat of further Soviet expansion into neighboring
countries in Southwest Asia, and also because such an aggressive military policy is unsettling to
other peoples throughout the world”103 (emphasis added). However, Carter concludes his speech
by proclaiming: “The response of the international community to the Soviet attempt to crush
Afghanistan must match the gravity of the Soviet action. With the support of the American
people and working with other nations, we will deter aggression, we will protect our Nation's
security, and we will preserve the peace.”104 Ultimately, Carter’s speech leaves listeners with two
main messages: the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan poses “extremely serious threats,”105 and,
thus, the international community—and especially the states in close physical proximity to
Afghanistan—must rally around the US government in its effort to punish the Soviet Union.
Prior to World War II, US global power was largely limited to the western hemisphere
and Pacific region. The United States had a substantial naval fleet and booming economy, but
was limited in its military and air capacities, and generally had restricted international ambitions.
Following World War II, however, the United States became the dominant world power, with
unparalleled military might (including the possession of nuclear weapons), widespread economic
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influence, and an extensive global network of diplomatic and intelligence personnel. During the
Cold War, this expansion of US power, as Rashid Khalidi argues, “was in large measure
predicated, at least as it was presented to the American public, on the newfound ‘need’ to
confront the Soviet Union.”106 The perceived Soviet threat served as the pretext for the
establishment of US military bases across the globe, as well as the United States’ vastly
expanded international economic, diplomatic, and intelligence presence. Accordingly, the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan was an ideal instrument through which to fortify US influence and
military presence in the Middle East and South Asia.
During the Cold War, the strategic importance of the Middle East became increasingly
apparent, due to both the region’s rich oil reserves and central geographical location at the nexus
of Eastern Europe, South Asia and North Africa. As a result, the regions surrounding the Middle
East also became highly important in the expansion of US global power. In a January 11, 1980
memo to Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, prominent US foreign policy advisor
Anthony Lake explains:
In the strategically important South Asia and Middle East region as a whole, we intend to maintain
a posture of strength, of vigilance, and of growing cooperation with the nations of the region that
seek a future free from outside intervention. This includes Indian Ocean deployments, discussions
with Kenya, Somalia and Oman concerning US access to their military facilities, and building
upon our economic and security assistance programs in the region.107

Two months later, in March 1980, the SCC released a secret discussion paper entitled “A
Security Framework for Southwest Asia,” confirming the US commitment to expand its naval
presence, access to military facilities, and ability to deploy and surge military forces in South
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Asia and the surrounding areas.108 In order to increase military capabilities in these areas,
however, the US government would have to strengthen its relationship with allies in the region.
The US effort to use the Soviet threat in Afghanistan to gain influence in the Middle East
is explicitly addressed in several US government documents and memos from 1980. For
instance, in a January 2, 1980 memo, Brzezinski urges Vance to “use the events in Afghanistan
as a rallying point for our policies in the area,”109 and in a March 19, 1980 memo (Figure 8),
Vance writes: “Our policy of making the USSR pay a price for its aggression and of using the
invasion to solidify our own relationship with the Islamic world requires maintaining the Afghan
resistance to the Soviets”110 (emphasis added).
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Figure 8: ‘Foreign Policy: Coherence and Sense of Direction.’ March 19, 1980. Box 7, Cyrus R. and Grace Sloane
Vance Papers, Yale Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Libraries.

Evidently, Vance and Brzezinski, who, as Secretary of State and National Security Advisor were
arguably the two most influential US foreign policymakers in 1980, were determined to
capitalize upon the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and subsequent perceived threat of Soviet
expansion into the Middle East in order to bolster support for the United States among Middle
Eastern nations.
In addition, it was clear to the US government that a prolonged Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan would likely cause particular damage to perceptions of the Soviet Union held in
Islamic societies. On the day following the invasion, Brzezinski wrote to President Carter:
“World public opinion may be outraged at the Soviet intervention. Certainly, Moslem countries
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will be concerned, and we might be in a position to exploit this.”111 Weeks later, a January 1980
CIA report also noted that “a prolonged and presumably ruthless Soviet effort to destroy the
Islamic Insurgency in Afghanistan would have continuing repercussions on the perceptions of
these [Middle Eastern] states, particularly those that are Muslim.”112 Evidently, US diplomatic
and intelligence personnel were cognizant of the damages that Soviet aggression in Afghanistan
would have on Soviet Union’s relationships with Muslim states and were eager to take advantage
of this opportunity.

Entrenching the US-Saudi Alliance
Within the Middle East, US officials were especially focused on building a relationship
with the Saudi Arabian government, which remains a significant US ally to this day. As
previously explained, US interest in Saudi Arabia developed after World War II, primarily due to
the US desire to acquire Saudi Arabian military bases, such as the highly-valued Dhahran
airbase, as well as to the desire to access Saudi Arabian oil. In addition to these strategic
interests, however, the Saudi kingdom had another crucial quality: it was not already part of any
world power’s sphere of influence. Indeed, Saudi Arabia was one of only two independent states
in the Middle East that had never been occupied by a European power, it did not have any nonUS foreign bases on its soil, and its ultra-religious Wahhabi monarchy was staunchly anticommunist. The Saudi Arabian government’s intense religiosity also gave the monarchy an
Islamic legitimacy, which the US government wished to harness against the brand of Shia
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revolutionary Islamism emerging in Iran.113 Thus, in Saudi Arabia, the US government saw a
unique opportunity to recruit a highly valuable ally. Given the advantages that a strong US-Saudi
partnership would present, US foreign policymakers were keen to use the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan to strengthen its ties with the Saudi Arabian government.
Throughout the 1970s, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, along with other US
government officials, had been working tirelessly to solidify US-Saudi relations. In a July 1973
conversation with Shah of Iran (who, at the time, was a close US ally), Kissinger stressed the
importance of incorporating Saudi Arabian leaders into the pre-existing US-Iranian alliance,
especially with regard to Middle Eastern political affairs.114 During this conversation, Kissinger
also alluded to struggles in securing Saudi Arabian cooperation, as well as the support of the
State Department, saying: “We have two problems in our government: One is to get the State
Department to move and the other is to get the Saudis to move.”115 In this comment, Kissinger
suggests that the US government was in need of an event or circumstance that would push the
Saudi Arabian leadership to cooperate more effectively with the United States. Ultimately, the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan would serve this purpose.
Later in 1973, Kissinger travelled to Riyadh where he met extensively with King Faisal
of Saudi Arabia to discuss the Israeli-Palestinian peace process,116 an issue that caused tension in
the US-Saudi relationship. Generally, as a result of disagreements between the US and Saudi
Arabian governments about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, US leaders felt they had to
compensate in other areas in order to secure Saudi Arabian loyalty. Consequently, as previously
113
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mentioned, in June 1974 Kissinger and President Nixon brought the Saudi Minister of the
Interior Prince Fahd to Washington in an effort to solidify a US-Saudi partnership against
communist forces in the Middle East, specifically South Yemen and Iraq (Figure 9). During this
visit, President Nixon stressed how important it would be for Saudi Arabia to serve as an anticommunist bulwark in the Persian Gulf “in view of the instability of new governments in that
area.”117 Ultimately, Prince Fahd affirmed his commitment to join the US government in the
fight against communism and pursue bilateral cooperation toward the goal of stability in the
Middle East.118 On this subject, Kissinger expressed his “willingness to cut through bureaucratic
obstacles to avoid their impending the [US-Saudi] cooperation,”119 underscoring the high value
he placed on expediting the US-Saudi partnership.
Notably, this June 1974 meeting transpired after the so-called 1973 Arab oil boycott of
the United States.120 Despite this setback in US-Saudi relations, US officials remained
determined to solidify an alliance with the Saudi Arabian government. In fact, during the June
1974 visit with Prince Fahd, President Nixon emphasized his view that “oil cannot hold people
together but friendship and respect can.”121 Prince Fahd agreed with the President, noting that
US-Saudi cooperation extended back to a time long before oil became an important commodity,
and stressing that Saudi Arabian foreign policy was based on “friendship and mutual interest
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with the United States.”122 The exchange between President Nixon and Prince Fahd reinforces
the notion that, contrary to popular belief, the US-Saudi alliance was founded upon much more
than oil. In reality, the two states sought to reinforce each other, both militarily and ideologically,
in order to protect the Saudi Arabian authority and US sphere of influence in the Middle East.
Ultimately, the Soviet-Afghan War provided a prime opportunity for the US government to
renew its cooperation with the Saudi Arabian monarchy in this area, thus further entrenching the
two countries’ alliance.
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Figure 9: United States National Security Council. [Saudi Arabia-U.S. Relations]. June 6, 1974. Digital National
Security Archive, http://search.proquest.com/docview/1679083916?accountid=15172. Pages 1-2.
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After the fall of the Shah of Iran in the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the US intelligence
community feared that the Saudi Arabian royal family might be next. These anxieties were
exacerbated by Islamic insurgencies such as Juhayman al-Utaybi’s November 1979 attempt to
seize Mecca’s Grand Mosque and the 1979 Shia Uprising in the Eastern Province. These events
shocked both the Saudi Arabian and US governments, signalling that they needed to learn more
about Islamic radicalism on the Arabian Peninsula. The fear of a potential Islamic revolution in
Saudi Arabia only deepened US desires to partner with, and bolster, the Saudi Arabian royal
family. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan provided an ideal platform for the realization of this
goal: in exchange for the Saudi commitment to back the Mujahedin in Afghanistan, the CIA
would help the Saudi Arabian General Intelligence Department (GID) identify and handle both
radical Islamic and communist threats to the Saudi kingdom.123 This deal was a win-win for the
US government: the Saudi Arabian government would take on some of the financial burden of
supporting the Mujahedin, while the CIA would work toward securing the reign of the Saudi
Arabian ruling family, thus strengthening the US-Saudi partnership.
During the 1970s, as a result of the so-called 1973 oil boycott, the Saudi Arabian
government had experienced a massive boom in oil revenues: from 1969 to 1974, the national
five-year budget was $9.2 billion, but from 1974 to 1979, this budget skyrocketed to $142
billion.124 The US government was well aware of Saudi Arabia’s enormous wealth, and eagerly
sought Saudi Arabian assistance to finance the Mujahedin. Even before the Soviets invaded of
Afghanistan, the CIA recruited the Saudi Arabian Government to contribute to its covert
operation in support of the Afghan rebels. An October 1979 CIA Intelligence Summary
confirmed that “Saudi Arabia is providing limited financial and material support to the tribal
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dissidents in Afghanistan,”125 and that “Saudi support for the Afghan rebels is likely to continue
[as] the Saudis have been pleased by the rebels’ military successes and will doubtless encourage
them to keep up the good fight for Allah.”126 Indeed, the US government recognized that, beyond
its enormous oil fortune, the Saudi Arabian government was an ideal candidate for the funding of
the Mujahedin as the depiction of the conflict as a religious war aligned with its staunch
conservative religiosity.
After the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, Saudi Arabian financial and military support of
the Mujahedin surged. In January 1980, the US State Department reported that the Saudi ulama
(religious leaders) had issued a fatwa (Islamic religious ruling) authorizing the payment of the
Saudi zakat (the 2.5 percent Muslim alms tax) to the Afghan Mujahedin fighters.127 In July 1980,
the US and Saudi Arabian governments reached a formal agreement, stipulating that Saudi
Arabia would match US funding of the Mujahedin, which levelled at approximately sixty million
dollars a year for the years 1981 through 1983 (with the Saudi Arabian contributions, this sum
was doubled to 120 million).128
Beyond financial arrangements, the cooperation of US and Saudi Arabian leaders also
flourished during the Soviet-Afghan War. In early February 1980, Brzezinski and Deputy
Secretary of State Warren Christopher visited Crown Prince Fahd and Foreign Minister Prince
Saud al-Faisal in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, where they discussed joint US-Saudi strategy in light of
the Soviet-Afghan War. Following the visit, Christopher wrote a thank you note that reads: “I
wish to express my appreciation for the friendly and candid discussions Mr. Brzezinski and I had
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with you during our visit to the Kingdom on February 4-5. We hope to work closely with you in
facing the Soviet threat in the Middle East and South Asia and, to that end, the discussions we
have had will be very helpful.”129 Following Brzezinski and Christopher’s visit, the Washington
Post reported that “Saudi Arabia indicated a new willingness to support the U.S. search for
military facilities in the Persian Gulf region, as a result of the threat posed by the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan, members of national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski’s delegation said
today.”130 Evidently, US efforts to use the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to strengthen ties with
the Saudi Arabian government in order to expand military capacities in the kingdom were
working.
During the late 1970s, the once weak and unprofessional Saudi Arabian GID had
underdone a significant revitalization, which included the appointment of Prince Turki al-Faisal
as the organization’s spy chief. Prince Turki ultimately served as director of the GID for more
than twenty years, and played a pivotal role in the facilitation of the CIA-GID partnership
throughout the Soviet-Afghan War. Turki had studied at an elite boarding school in New Jersey,
and later at Georgetown University, which allowed him to adeptly navigate between Saudi
Arabia and the United States. Ultimately, Turki became an instrumental figure in coordinating
the joint US-Saudi support of the Mujahedin.
In addition, Turki proved very useful to the US government due to his ability to
coordinate with Pakistan, another key player in the pro-Mujahedin alliance. Prior to the SovietAfghan War, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia had a clandestine alliance, grounded in their common

129

United States Embassy, Saudi Arabia, Letters to Fahd and Saud from Deputy Secretary, February 7, 1980, Digital
National Security Archive, http://search.proquest.com/docview/1679078140?accountid=15172.
130
Stuart Auerbach, “Saudis Termed Responsive to U.S. Military Needs,” The Washington Post, February 6, 1980,
A7.

61

identities as young, insecure, and intrinsically Islamic nations.131 In the past, the Saudi Arabian
government had even hired Pakistani troops for security deployments within the kingdom, and
the Saudi Arabian air force had secretly covered the air space over Karachi during the 1971 war
between Pakistan and India.132 The CIA had already established a working partnership with the
Pakistani ISI, but Turki, who travelled to Pakistan up to five times a month in the early 1980s,133
was instrumental in facilitating the channelling of aid and arms to the Mujahedin through
Pakistan. With this arrangement, Turki helped to not only solidify the US-Saudi partnership, but
also to strengthen Pakistan’s position as a regional ally.
It is thus clear that the Soviet invasion of, and continued presence in, Afghanistan was
highly useful in the process of solidifying the US alliance with the Saudi Arabian government
and reinforcing general US influence in the Middle East. Ultimately, the US government was
able to use Soviet intervention in Afghanistan to further intensify the fears of a communist
expansion into the Middle East that had grown during Nasser’s socialist rule in Egypt (1956 to
1970). The US government successfully capitalized on these fears in order to reinvigorate the
US-Saudi partnership and secure Saudi Arabian loyalty for decades to come.

Conclusion
This essay has provided a new framework for conceptualizing the US support of the
Mujahedin during the Soviet-Afghan War. First, US officials did not expect the Soviet Union to
invade Afghanistan, and therefore US covert aid to the anti-communist Afghan rebels, which
began on July 3, 1979, was not meant simply to bolster the rebel forces in preparation for a
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probable Soviet attack. Instead, the covert aid was used as a tool to escalate the Afghan
insurgency in order to draw the Soviet Union into a long and arduous war in Afghanistan. As
Brzezinski put it, covert aid to the Afghan rebels “had the effect of drawing the Russians into the
Afghan trap.”134
Second, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan presented several strategic benefits to the US
government. Namely, Soviet military aggression in Afghanistan provided the US government
with the opportunity to inflict severe economic and political costs on the Soviet Union, magnify
global hostility towards the Soviet Union, solidify support from European allies for global antiSoviet initiatives, expand the US sphere of influence in the Middle East, and deepen the bond
between the US and Saudi Arabian governments. Contrary to historical narratives that present
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as a disaster for US Cold War strategy and foreign interests,
the Soviet-Afghan War was actually an important part of the US government’s quest for military
and ideological dominance in the Middle East and for an entrenched US-Saudi alliance, which
were key objectives in its overarching goal of consolidating US global power and influence.
At the end of Brzezinski’s 1998 interview with Le Nouvel Observateur, the interviewer
asks the former National Security Advisor if he “regret[s] having supported Islamic
fundamentalism, which has given arms and advice to future terrorists.”135 In response, Brzezinski
asks: “What is more important in world history, the Taliban or the collapse of the Soviet Empire?
Some agitated Muslims or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the Cold War?”136 The
defeat of the Soviet Union was certainly a significant US victory, but we must not forget the
price at which the Cold War was won. One wonders if, in today’s post-9/11 world, characterized

134

Jauvert, “Les Révélations d’un Ancien Conseiller de Carter,” 76.
Ibid.
136
Ibid.
135

63

by an explosion of militant Islamist extremism and the subsequent US war on terror, Brzezinski
would still diminish the outcomes of the US support of the Mujahedin to “some agitated
Muslims.”137
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Bibliographic Essay
The seeds of my senior essay were planted when, in my “Islam Today: Jihad and
Fundamentalism” course, my classmates and I analyzed President George W. Bush’s September
20, 2001 address, in which he declared the US “war on terror.”138 Responding to the devastating
9/11 attacks, Bush promised to “direct every resource at [his] command…to the destruction and
to the defeat of the global terror network.”139 Fifteen years later, Islamist extremist groups—and,
appallingly, in the eyes of some individuals and Presidential candidates, Muslims in general—
have remained US public enemies. When learning and thinking about the current global stream
of Islamist extremism and terrorism, I couldn’t help but wonder: How did we get here?
As I began researching the development of al-Qaeda and rise of global militant Islamist
extremism, I soon learned that the Soviet-Afghan War played a significant role. Journalist Steve
Coll’s Ghost Wars was particularly helpful on this subject. Based on scrupulous research and
firsthand accounts by US and foreign government, intelligence, and military personnel, Ghost
Wars recounts the history and consequences of US intervention in Afghanistan, beginning with
the Soviet-Afghan War. Ghost Wars also documents the extensive cooperation between the US,
Saudi Arabian, and Pakistani governments during their joint support of the Mujahedin, which led
me to begin investigating how and why US government officials built such strong working
partnerships with these non-democratic governments, and the Saudi Arabian government in
particular.
In addition, Professor Rosie Bsheer’s seminar “Reformers and Revolutionaries in the
Arab World” was highly influential on my senior essay research. The material and discussions in
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this course helped me understand salient social and political dynamics in the modern Middle
East, and gave me the necessary tools to take a critical approach to US involvement in the
Middle East since World War II.
A pivotal moment in my research occurred when I discovered the 1998 Le Nouvel
Observateur interview with former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, in which he
admits that the 1979 US aid to the Mujahedin “increase[ed] the probability”140 of a Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan, ultimately “drawing the Russians into the Afghan trap.”141 Upon
reading this interview, I was struck by the extent to which Brzezinski’s admissions conflicted
with the narratives put forth by prominent historians such as John Lewis Gaddis and Amin
Saikal, who maintain that the US government was blindsided by the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, frame the event as a Cold War catastrophe, and do not discuss any of the strategic
values of the Soviet-Afghan War to the US government. Puzzled by the fact that Brzezinski’s
1998 admissions had not been integrated into contemporary historical accounts of the Cold War,
I began to look for primary sources that could elucidate this disconnect.
My investigation of the claims made by Brzezinski in the 1998 interview began with the
Digital National Security Archive, which, along with the online Cold War International History
Project, proved to be an invaluable database. After months of retrieving, scrutinizing,
interpreting, and analyzing dozens of declassified US government documents, reports, and
memorandums, it became clear to me that the US government did, indeed, increase the chances
of a Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, rather than attempt to prevent this outcome.
Upon reaching this conclusion, I began to wonder why the US government would have
favored Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, especially given President Carter’s public
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indignation of the invasion. On this question, the books Good Muslim, Bad Muslim by Mahmood
Mamdani and Sowing Crisis by Rashid Khalidi were highly useful. In Good Muslim, Bad
Muslim, Mamdani writes about how the US government and its allies framed the Soviet-Afghan
War as a religious conflict in order to draw Muslims from around the world to fight in the
Mujahedin army, and to create a pro-US brand of militant Islamism. In Sowing Crisis, Khalidi
explains that, throughout the Cold War, the US government used the Soviet threat as a pretext for
the expansion of its military, economic, and intelligence capabilities across the globe, and
particularly in the Middle East.
With Mamdani and Khalidi’s insights in mind, I began to search for concrete ways in
which the Soviet-Afghan War served US foreign interests. I was pleased to learn that the Cyrus
R. and Grace Sloane Vance Papers are housed at Yale’s Manuscripts and Archives Library, and
headed to Sterling Memorial Library to see if the former Secretary of State’s archive contained
any useful sources for my senior essay. Within the Vance archive, I found a multitude of
documents, memorandums, and personal notes outlining efforts made by Vance and other US
government officials to use the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to secure support from European
allies for US-led anti-Soviet initiatives, such as the boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics and
the imposition of substantial economic sanctions on the Soviet Union. Motivated by my findings
in the Vance archive, I continued to search through the Digital National Security Archive, and
found several sources revealing multiple other ways in which Soviet military intervention in
Afghanistan advanced US foreign interests. Most notably, these sources related to the US desires
to inflict economic and political costs on the Soviets, strengthen the US sphere of influence in
the Middle East, and solidify the US alliance with the Saudi Arabian government. After a few
additional weeks of research, I felt I had found enough material to argue that, contrary to the
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narrative put forth by prominent Cold War historians, the Soviet-Afghan War did serve US
interests.
I am extremely grateful to Professor Rosie Bsheer, for her endless guidance and for
showing me that a true historian does not simply believe everything she hears in politics or in the
news. Through her seminar, lecture, and senior essay advising, Professor Bsheer has offered me
crucial insights on modern Middle Eastern history, taught me how to avoid writing errors I didn’t
even know I was making, and ultimately has made me a better critical thinker. I would also like
to thank my family—Mom, Dad, Maya, and Anna Lisa—and Ariel for their never-ending love
and support.
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